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For rna ny years, the largest sector of Oklahoma's agriculture has 
been the livestock industry and within the livestock industry, cattle 
have been the largest share of Oklahoma's production. The revenues 
generated from cattle production have been extremely unstable with 
some years resulting in profits and other years in substantial losses 
during the past decade. Due to several unprofitable years in the 
recent decade, cattlemen have become increasingly aware that their 
risk-taking ability depends directly upon their profits. 
f . h d f ak." . 1 Pro ~ts are t e rewar s or t ~ng r~sks. Unfortunately many 
cattlemen have encountered few rewards compared to the astronomical 
risks they have taken. As such, in Oklahoma and all across the United 
States, cattlemen have been forced to terminate cattle production 
because of financial difficulties. 
A 1mo s t a 11 financial difficulties can be linked to two types of 
risks: financial and business. Financial risks pertain to the degree 
to which the firm has been leveraged (debt financed). When financial 
risks become burdensome usually a "wrong" business decision has been 
1 
John Ikerd and Francis Epplin. "Livestock Decision Risk 
Analysis." OSU Current Report CR-310, February 1983. 
l 
2 
made at an earlier date. Business risk is the chance of a negative 
outcome from a business decision. Two categories of business risks 
are production risks and market risks. Production risks relate to any 
adverse effects causing unfavorable production costs such as weather, 
higher feed costs, 2 etc. As such, production risks would merely 
ra~se the breakeven price and thus would not be a candidate for 
caus ~ng a firm to become severely overleveraged. So the major concern 
with regard to management of risks is market risks. 
Market risks result from the probability of an adverse movement 
of prices. For some firms, one severe adverse movement of prices 
could financially ruin the firm. Because of the large market risks, 
agricultural economists have suggested using forward contracting or 
the futures market to reduce market risks. 
Forward contrc..cts can be difficult to arrange (e.g. 
time-consuming, requiring many negotiations, and virtually an 
irreversible decision) and therefore their ability to offset market 
risks is diminished. As for the futures market, many cattle producers 
have become extremely disenchanted •vith the prospects of hedging. 3 
The disenchantment stems from the producers' lack of understanding and 
experience with the futures market. Some cattlemen do not understand 
that the futures market is principally a risk adversion technique and 
not necessarily a place to make profits with respect to hedging. So 
2 Ikerd and Epplin, p.310.1. 
3 d . . He g~ng ~s 
position ~n the 
markets. 
che process of taking an equal but opposite 
futures market than what a person has in the cash 
3 
when producers are told that the futures market is not a profit making 
venture for the hedger, they simply avoid using the futures market. 
Thus, many cattlemen are continuing to bear all the market risks and 
the problem of when to buy or sell cattle in the cash markets remains 
a major concern. 
The Problem 
Violent fluctuations 1.n cattle prices have caused a drastic 
increase in risk faced by cattlemen in the United States during the 
past decade. During a five-month period in 1979, the Omaha weekly 
average cash price for 900-1100 pound Choice steers dropped from 
$77 .00/cwt (hundredweight) on April 21 to $58.28/cwt by August 11 and 
then rose to $68.82/cwt by September 22. The total change in price 
was $29.26/cwt or roughly $300 per head, and since 1972 there have 
been sixteen occasions when the weekly average price has changed at 
least $10/cwt within a 6-month period. Consequently to obtain the 
most favorable price in the face of such instability, cattlemen need 
to make timely marketing decisions. 
Timely marketing decisions can only be enacted with a sufficient 
amount of market information. However, what is considered sufficient 
information for one producer may not be sufficient for another 
producer. There fore, the need for an objective marketing strategy 
using readily available information to aid cattlemen in making their 
timely marketing decisions becomes apparent. 
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Objectives 
The primary objective of this thesis is to establish objective 
rules for buying and selling cattle in the cash markets. 
The specific objectives include: 
l. To develop a set of moving averages using average cash 
prices over the past decade that would maximize returns to producers. 
2. To determine if an optimized set of moving averages used in 
conjunction with a Relative Strength Index (RSI) would further 
increase profits and reduce profit variability compared to a fixed 
period strategy of marketing slaughter cattle. 
Literature Review 
A 1 though a number of studies has been conducted concerning the 
use of an optimized moving average and the validity of RSI, all 
results known to the author were conducted in the futures market and 
not in the cash market. Thus, this review is centered upon the 
conceptual uses and results of the respective technical tools. 
The Role of Moving Averages for Effective 
Timing of Purchases and Sales 
Lehenbauer· (1978) optimized moving averages and point-and-figure 
parameters 1.n terms of net profit for feeder cattle in the futures 
market. His primary goal was profit maximization with a secondary 
goal of risk reduction. Lehenbauer found that technical tools 
definitely increased net profits while at the same time lowering 
risks. He predicted that cattle prices would continue to be very 
5 
volatile. Lehenbauer also forewarned of financial disaster if unsound 
marketing practices were followed. 
Hochheimer (1978) for Merrill Lynch studied the optimization of 
simple moving averages, exponential moving averages, and linearly 
weighted moving averages for several commodities, including cattle, in 
the futures market. He determined that the simple moving average 
worked better than either the linearly weighted or exponential 
average. However, He concluded that moving averages were very 
susceptible to large strings of losses and as such the person using 
moving averages ~V"ould have to psychologically cope with the losses. 
He stated that in order for technical tools to be of any advantage, 
the person that used the tools must be a well disciplined trader. 
Corballis (1980) presented a pamphlet for Thomson McKinnon which 
discussed various types of technical analysis, including moving 
averages. He gave a brief overv~ew as follows: 
Moving averages are part of the technician's basi-c 
tools for 'determining price trend. The purpose of 
the moving average is to smooth prices in such a 
way that the overall directional movement becomes 
apparent (p.6). 
I 
His results suggested that the length of the moving average was far 
more important than the met,hod of calculation, i.e. simple versus 
linearly weighted. 
Shields (1980) optimized moving averages for feeder cattle, live 
cattle, and corn with a direct search technique called the Box Complex 
Procedure. He found that multiple hedging could potentially increase 
profits and reduce price variability for a continuous fuedlot 
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operation. 4 He concluded that other technical tools, besides moving 
averages, could help producers decide when to buy or sell. 
Ikerd (1982) mentioned that determining the length of moving 
averages to use involved an important trade-off. He stated that the 
shorter the length and the smaller the differences of averages used, 
the greater the number of trade signals that would be generated, thus 
lowering the profit per trade. If a longer set of moving averages are 
used, Ikerd argued, whipsaw losses would be reduced at the expense of 
perhaps a substantial price movement before trade signals were 
generated. 
Franzmann and Sronce (1983) optimized moving averages for 
multiple hedging programs for hogs. They used the Box Complex 
Procedure to optimize the moving averages and then tried to reoptimize 
the moving averages over selected intervals. They concluded that 
profits generated from the reoptimizing programs were less than a 
single set of optimized moving average over the entire test period. 
The Role of Relative Strength Index for 
Determining Overbought and Oversold 
Situations 
Wilder ( 1 9 78) introduced a special momentum oscillator r,v-hich not 
only \vould calculate the velocity of directional price movement, but 
also had a definite range of 0 to 100, unlike all other oscillators. 
The new tool was named Relative Strength Index. RSI allowed traders, 
I 
"'"Hultiple hedging involves hedging the same commodity more than 
once with the idea of reducing losses in uptrending markets. 
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according to Wilder, to overcome three problems of other oscillators; 
namely, 1) erratic movement within oscillator configuration, 2) the 
scale to use for the "Y" axis, and 3) necessity of having to handle 
enormous amounts of data. He showed the necessary calculations for 
deriving RSI and .stated that tops and bottoms of prices were predicted 
when RSI went above 70 or below 30 respectively. lvilder concluded 
that RSI should be used in conjunction with other technical tools. 
Minor (1978) explained Wilder's RSI concept with mathematics. He 
stated that mathematics proved that RSI values should 1.ncrease 
(decrease) on days that the price closed above (below) the previous 
trading day. Minor suggested that RSI signaled a trend reversal when 
a value of SO was crossed from either direction. He agreed with 
Wilder that no si'ngle tool was correct 100 percent of the time and, as 
such, the RSI should be used with other tools. 
Minor (1980) looked at various lengths of RSI calculations, in 
particular 9-day and 25-day calculation period. He concluded that 
length was important, but that the 14-day calculation as suggested by 
Wilder appeared to work best. Minor noted that the index did not 
perform well with sudden increases in market volatility and that 
divergence was more likely to appear in shorter calculation 
5 lengths. 
Schlobohm (1982) provided a "quick-fire" way to calculate RSI. 
Although the values were not the same as those when using the 
conventional methods for calculating RSI, he found that his method was 
5 · h . d RSI 1 D 1. v e r g e n c e o c c u r s ~·7 e n p r 1. c e s an . v a ue s are 
simultaneously trending in opposite directions, i.e. prices trending 
up and RSI values trending down and vice-versa. 
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close enough to give a trader an indication of whether or not the 
market was overbought or oversold. Schlobohm suggested that values of 
25 to 35 indicated times to buy and values of 65 to 75 as possible 
selling points. He also pointed out that smce RSI's introduction in 
1978, the technical tool had become one of the most popular trading 
tools. 
Franzmann (1983) presented a paper to the 19th Annual OSU Cattle 
Feeders' Seminar suggesting the use of RSI to choose times to hedge. 
He noted that in recent years live cattle futures prices tended to top 
or react toRSI values of 70 and to bottom or react toRSI values of 
30. Franzmann showed the similarities between RSI and vertical line 
charts. He proceeded to talk about failure swings which indicate 
market reversal and divergence which indicates either market weakness 
or market strength depending upon price and RSI values. He also 
concluded that RSI used 1n conjunction with other technical tools 
could greatly aid producers in their marketing decisions. 
CHAPTER II 
THEORY OF MOVING AVERAGES AND RELATIVE 
STRENGTH INDEX AND PROCEDURE 
People are constantly looking for advice concerning what the 
future will hold, and cattlemen are no different with respect to 
cattle pr~ces. Unfortunately, no one ~s known to have a system which 
provides perfect forecasts of cattle prices. Since a perfect system 
has not been found, marketing specialists continue to search for 
better means to improve price forecasts. 
Extensive price forecasting studies have been conducted in the 
futures market using technical analysis, based on past price trends, 
to determine r.¥hen to buy or sell a futures contract. The studies 
concluded that technical analysis, although not perfect, could aid in 
the prediction o£ relative tops and bottoms of futures market prices. 
Although many cattle producers choose not to trade in the futures 
market, technical analysis may be as effective a market indicator m 
the cash market as in the futures market. If so, cattlemen may be 
able to improve their marketing decisions by applying technical 
analysis to cash prices. 
The Moving Average Technique 
Perhaps the most popular technical tool developed to date is the 
moving average. Calculation simplicity and potential price trend 
9 
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prediction has pushed moving averages into popularity among traders in 
the stock market and futures market. Moving averages are used by some 
traders because of the complete objectivity of the tool. 1 Many 
technical tools require some subjectivity on the part of the trader. 
However, moving averages provide a precise date on which to buy or 
sell. 
To calculate a moving average value requires only elementary 
arithmetic. This study is concerned with two of the more popular 
moving average schemes -- namely the simple moving average and the 
linearly weighted moving average. No doubt much of the popularity of 
the two named m o v i n g aver age s s t ems from the i r re 1 at i v e 1 y easy 
calculation. The simple moving average, as the name implies, involves 
summing the most recent desired number of prices (e.g. closing price 
or average price, etc.) with the number being determined by the length 
of the moving average desired and then dividing by the length of the 
moving average. For example, a simple 6-day moving average would sum 
the six most recent days of prices and then would divide that sum by 6 
to achieve the moving average for that day. The next day, the oldest 
pr~ce would be dropped and the newest price (the next day's price) 
would be summed with the remaining five days and then divided by 6 to 
receive the next day's moving average and continuing endlessly. 
The linearly weighted moving average uses the same basic concept 
as the simple moving average, except the linear weighting puts more 
emphasis on the more recent prices. A weight of one is given to the 
1John Ikerd and John Franzmann, "Using Futures For Hedging: 
Multiple Hedging Livestock" OSU Extension Facts No. 444 (Stillwater, 
1980)' p.444.4. 
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oldest price, two is given to the next oldest price continuing up to 
the desired length of the moving average. The weighted prices are 
divided by the sum of the weights. 2 
A buy ( s e 11) signal is generated when the smaller length moving 
average 1 s value becomes greater (smaller) than the larger moving 
average 1 s value. For example, if we were using a 3-day and a 10-day 
average a sell signal would be produced whenever the 3-day average had 
a value smaller than the 10-day average. Figure 1 presents a 
graphical illustration of the previously stated example. 
A set of three moving averages can be used as illustrated in 
Figure 2 and discussed below. The intermediate and largest averages 
work the same as with a set of two averages except that the smallest 
average of the 3 confirms the buy and sell signals of the intermediate 
and largest averages. The third moving average was included to reduce 
the "whipsaw effects" of just two moving averages. The idea behind 
reducing the whipsaw effect is to keep the averages from switching 
back and forth during market consolidations (sideways movements) and 
thus resulting in numerous losses. 
2 rllustration of calculating a 4-day linearly weighted moving 
average with n representing the most recent price. 
Day Price Weight Product 
n 50.00 X 4 = 200.00 
n-1 51.00 X 3 = 153.00 
n-2 49.50 X 2 = 99.00 
n-3 50.00 X 1 50.00 
10 502.00 
The 4-day linearly weighted average is 502.00/10 = 50.20 
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Figt:re 2. TradE. Signals from Three Moving Averages 
14 
Another idea used in conjunction with movlng averages to reduce 
h . h . 1 3 w 1.psaws ts t.e pene.:rat1.on rue. The penetration rule, like the 
third moving average, reduces the number of unprofitable trades 
especially during consolidations. However, when one protects against 
consolidations, the signals for a top or a bottom are generated 
substantially later than without a penetration rule. Normally a 
penetration rule ranges from 0 cents to 20 cents per hundredweight for 
cattle in the futures market. If a trader used a set of two averages 
and a penetration rule of 5 cents per hundredweight, then buy signals 
would be given when the smaller average beca~re greater than the larger 
average by at least 5 cents per hundredweight and conversely for a 
sell signal. With a set of three averages, the intermediate average 
would have to become at least 5 cents per hundredweight greater than 
the largest average with the smallest average confirming the buy 
signal (the smallest being greater than the intermediate average) in 
order to have a legitimate buy signal and once again conversely for a 
sell signal. 
Regardless of whether a third movtng average and/or a penetration 
rule 1.s incorporated, moving averages work best in long trending 
markets. As mentioned earlier, the third moving average or 
penetration rule is used mainly for market consolidation detection and 
not for absolute bottoms or tops. Perhaps a tool that could predict 
relative bottoms and tops might enhance the profitability of a moving 
average scheme. 
3 A penetration rule is a technique used to help alleviate 
whipsaw effects from a moving average 3trategy by requiring the 
signalling average to be at least greater (smaller) by the penetration 
rule than the longest average. 
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The Relative Strength Index Technique 
The Re 1 at i ve Strength Index (RSI) is a momentum oscillator which 
measures the velocity of price movements. Unlike RSI' s predecessors, 
RSI has a definite range of 0 to 100. The calculation of RSI, as with 
moving averages, involves simple arithmetic which is presented in the 
discussion that follows. Wilder, the developer of the RSI, suggests a 
formula of: 
where 
RSI = 100 - 100 
l+RS 
RS = average of 14 days closes up 
average of 14 days closes down 
For c onv en ience, Wilder provided a worksheet for calculating the 
RSI as can be seen ~n Table I. Column one was reserved for the date 
and column two was used for recording the desired price (closing 
price, settlement price, average price, etc.) for the respective 
dates. Column three was used to record positive differences bet'.Yeen 
two consecutive days and column four was to record negative 
differences between two consecutive days. Column five contain the 
average up value for the 14-day period and column six contained the 
average down value for the same period. Column seven was the ratio of 
column five (average up) divided by column six (average down) which 
was the RS value from above. Column eight contained the ratio of 100 
divided by column seven plus 1 and finally, column nine contained the 
value of 100 minus column 8 or the RSI value for that particular date. 
TABLE I 
RLLATIVE STRENGTif WORKSHEET 
Settle Up Down Uu Down 
Date Price Change Change Average AveragE. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
7-13 62.05 
7-14 62.95 .90 
/-15 62.70 .25 
7-16 63.00 . 30 
7-19 62.40 .60 
7-20 62.45 .05 
7-21 62.65 .20 
7-22 62.40 .25 
7-23 62.30 . 10 
7-2c 63.05 . 75 
7-27 63.90 .85 
7-28 63.40 .50 
7-29 63.10 . 30 
i'-30 62.85 .25 
8-02 63.05 .20 . 2321 .1607 
8-03 62.95 .10 . 2155 .1564 
8-04 63.05 .10 . 2073 . 1452 
8-05 6:).05 --- --- .1925 . 1348 
























To update the RSI value for the next day, one would merely 
multiply the previous day's up average by 13 and add the current day's 
up value, if any, then divide by 14 to calculate the new up average. 
Next, repeat the same procedure for the down average to obtain the new 
down average. 
mentioned above. 
The remaining columns are calculated the same as 
In the lower ranges of 0 to 35, RSI indicates the market is 
oversold which suggests that the price should increase. Figure 3 
presents a graphical illustration of RSI and futures prices. Points I 
and II 1.n Figure 3 both indicate that the market 1.s 1.n an oversold 
area and that the market price should increase, and, in fact, the 
market price did increase. 
In the upper ranges of 65 to 100, RSI indicates that the market 
1.s in an overbought area which means the price should decline. In 
Figure 3, points A, B, and C have a RSI value above 65 suggesting that 
the pr1.ce might fall which, indeed, the price did. However, the market 
did not stop its upward trend. A possible explanation for the RSI's 
detection of the overbought areas might be that the market was 
entering into a small correction move in order to continue the overall 
uptrend. However, note the larger drop in prices preceeding point II 
which the RSI's values did not predict as strongly as the other points 
of A, B, and C. This particular situation does not invalidate the RSI 
systems, but it merely shows us the limitations of the tool. 
RSI predicts "relative" tops and bottoms and not necessarily the 
very top or very bottom of a market. Relative Strength Index does not 
enable a trader to predict where prices are going su.:h as $60 per cwt, 




Figure 3. 1984 April Live Cattle Futures Contract Prices with RSI 
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future. A trader should note that RSI does not give a precise day in 
which to enter into the market. Hence, marketing strategies should 
not be based solely upon RSI. 
Procedure 
The length of the moving averages is optimized using weekly 
average cash prices quoted by USDA's "Livestock Meat and Wool" from 
1972 to 1982 for Omaha Choice 2-4, 900-1100 pound steers; Omaha Choice 
2-4, 900-1100 pound heifers; and Texas Panhandle Choice 2-4, 900-1100 
pound steers. The optimization was evaluated in terms of profits 
generated from a set of buy and sell signals via the crossing of the 
moving averages. 
A Relative Strength Index was calculated using the same data as 
the moving averages. The RSI vaiue was used then as a confirming 
technique where buy signals generated by the moving averages were not 
honored when RSI was below 40. In addition an automatic sell was 
signalled whenever RSI reached 90 if the moving averages had not as 
yet indicated a sell signal. The RSI value was used in conjunction 
with the optimized moving averages to reduce the "whipsaw effects" 
resulting from the sole use of moving averages. Because the RSI value 
was not available until the fifteenth week of 1972, all trade signals 
generated by the moving averages before the fifteenth week of 1972 
were not honored so that all trades could be confimed by a RSI value. 
Summary 
This chapter included a discussion on the two basic tools, namely 
moving averages and RSI, that will be used in conjunction with one and 
20 
another to form a cattle marketing strategy. Both the strengths and 
weaknesses of each tool were brought forth in an effort to better 
inform potential users of these technical tools. And lastly, the 
procedure used to develop the marketing strategy for this study was 
outlined. 
CHAPTER III 
SELECTION OF AN OPTIMUM HOVING AVERAGE PARAMETER IN 
CONJUNCTION WITH RELATIVE STRENGTH INDEX 
Technical marketing strategies have been used extensively by 
stock market and futures market traders over the past decade. Many 
traders concluded that the effectiveness of technical tools have 
discounted the Theory of Random Walk. Random Walk suggests that price 
differences from one day to the next are purely random and follow no 
set pattern. T:Iowever, since profitable trades have been generated 
using technical tools, this fact would support the idea that prices 
might follow s orne s art of a trend during a particular time interval 
and thus discount the Theory of Random Walk. Therefore, if price 
trends can be identified in the cattle futures market, it would seem 
only natural co be able to identify price trends in the cash markets 
for cattle and vice versa. This chapter will attempt to provide a 
technical marketing strategy which will present a viable prediction of 
price trends in the cash slaughter cattle markets. 
The slaughter cattle market was chosen because of the seemingly 
lower price volatility compared with that of the stocker/feeder 
market. Perhaps one reason for the lower volatility could stem from 
the fewer alternatives a producer has with a 1100 pound animals 
compared '.vith 500-600 pound animals. Specifically, the three markets 
21 
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chosen for this study were Omaha Choice 2-4, 900-1100 pound steers; 
Omaha Choice 2-4, 900-1100 pound heifers; and Texas Choice 2-4, 
900-1100 pound ~teers. These specific markets were chosen because 
they had a sufficient volume of cattle sales to be quoted in the 
USDA's weekly publication of "Livestock Meat and Wool". The prices 
quoted were the weekly average prices for the respective cash markets. 
Eleven years of data, specifically 1972-1982, for each of the three 
markets were used to calculate various moving averages in an attempt 
to find an optimum moving average. Eleven years of data were used to 
1 insure that a complete revolution of the cattle cycle had elapsed. 
Although the marketing grades changed over the period from Choice to 
Choice 2-4, the animals slaughtered remained basically of the same 
quality. 
The Moving Average and RSI Program 
A moving average and RSI program for the Radio Shack 
microcomputer was developed at Oklahoma State University. 2 Unlike 
the Box Complex Procedure, the Radio Shack program simply calculates 
either a simple or linearly weighted moving averages and 
. 1 1 1 f f. d 3 s 1.mu t ane ous y an R S I va ue or a set o pr1.ce at a. The lengths 
of the moving averages used are completely up to the discretion of the 
1 John R. F r anzmann, "Cattle Cycles Revisited", Southern Jo•.· .. n~ l of Agricultural Economics, December 1971, pp.69-76. 
2 
Aseem Das, a computer programmer assistant for the Agricultural Economics D~partment, was the creator of the program. 
3 
The Box Complex Procedure is a direct search technique that finds the optimum moving averages for a set of price data. 
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user, however the RSI is fixed at a length of 14 because it is the 
most common length associated with RSI. The only drawback to the 
Radio Shack program 1s that the trader is requirPd to search through 
the computer printouts to determine the times 1n which trade signals 
are generated. 
Using the Moving Average Technique 
An important assumption should be noted here. A major assumption 
1n this moving average strategy was that the weekly average price of 
the week which generated the signal could be attained during the next 
week. For instance, if the end of week 1 generated a buy signal at a 
weekly average price of $65 per cwt, then it was assumed that the 
range of prices 1n week 2 would include $65 per ewe with the actual 
trade taking place tn week 2. Of course, some weeks a trader would 
have prices move in his favor with respect to the previous week's 
weekly average price and conversely the prices would move against the 
trader some weeks. However, in the long run these two forces were 
assumed to offset one another and the assumption would hold. 
Nevertheless, this study continued as if this major assumption held. 
Tables II-IV provide the various averages tried, the penetration 
rule, if any, net profit, gross profit, gross losses, sum of largest 
set of consecutive losses, and the number of consecutive losses for 
the three markets. Gross profits and gross losses were calculated by 
substracting the initial buying price from the selling price. Net 
profit was determined by subtracting gross losses from gross profits 


















HOVING AVERAGES RESULTS FOR OHAHA SLAUGHTER 
STEERS, 1972-1982 
Penetration Net Gross Gross 








107.53 147.24 40. 71 6.01 
73.59 88.16 1L~. 57 4.26 
71.62 88.68 17.06 4.36 
62.13 83.09 20.96 5.9,0 
.09 56.42 74.69 18.27 8.97 
55.42 69.13 13.71 6.64 
.07 54.40 76.28 21.88 8.22 
45.83 69.52 23.69 7.48 
45.82 69.25 23.43 7.08 
.04 44.49 73.82 29.33 7.28 
39.75 68.92 29. 17 8.73 
35.94 68.46 32.52 9.08 
.05 35.90 67.47 31.57 8,46 
.06 30.51 54.10 23.59 10.55 






















































91.14 137.65 46.51 7.52 
76.47 88.68 12.21 3.17 
71.05 87.55 16.50 3.07 
66.86 84.80 17.94 4. 72 
56.85 71.81 14.96 8.87 
50.97 72.26 21.29 5.73 
.09 49.72 74.63 24.91 5.91 
49.39 73.14 23.75 6.97 
49.27 71.25 21.98 6.97 
.04 49.14 69.73 20.59 6.97 
.05 44.31 71.03 26.72 11.13 
.06 40.45 51.55 11.10 5.88 
38.60 61.42 22.82 10.53 
34.57 60.36 25.79 11. 13 






















































143. !f9 173.69 30.20 4.35 12 
68.75 97.42 28.67 6.53 6 
56.26 88.36 32.10 8.35 5 
.07 47.64 82.64 35.00 13.10 4 
44.45 85.06 40.61 11.29 5 
34.53 7 !1. 36 39.83 12.13 4 
33.39 66.78 34.65 11.58 2 
.09 29.95 72.02 42.07 11.96 5 
24.07 74.45 50.38 14.66 5 
.04 23.11 74.20 51.09 14.66 5 
.06 20.57 54.88 34.31 15.70 3 
15.74 74.61 58.87 19.66 6 
8.34 66.94 58.60 18.13 5 
.05 5.30 72.39 67.09 19.43 5 




losses was generated by surrnning the occas1ons when two or more losses 
occurred in succession and the sum of largest set of consecutive 
1 o s s e s was a s i!!! r. 1 e add i t ion o f the g r e ate s t g r o s s 1 o s s e s 1n 
succession. The moving averages were given in descending order m 
terms of net profit. 
The l-2w ( l-2w denotes a set of averages where 1 signifies the 
first moving average (1 week), 2 signifies the second moving average 
(2 weeks), and w denotes linearly weighted) moving averages were the 
"best" averages in all three markets. Tables V-VII present the l-2w 
averages with various penetration rules. Note chat some penetration 
rules increased net profit while others decreased net profit compared 
to the no penetration rule. In all markets, the gross losses were 
reduced by the use of penetration rules. Specifically, l-2w (10), 
were the optimum averages for Omaha steers, l-2w (10) were best for 
Omaha heifers, and l-2w (05) were the most profitable averages for 
Texas 4 steers. However, an alarming outcome for the l-2w averages 
1n all three markets was the number of occasions when the averages 
generated a buy signal one week and a sell signal the very next week. 
So to make the moving averages a more realistic marketing strategy a 
restriction was enforced to honor sell signals only between the 
seventeenth and twenty-fifth week after the intial buy signal. This 
strategy was set forth to ensure that the animals marketed weighed 
between 900-1100 pounds. 
Another unexpected result from the 1-2w moving averages 1n the 
Omaha steer and heifer markets was the relative size of the gross 
t.. 
The number in parentheses indicates the penetration rule 1n 
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losses and the number of consecutive losses as compared with the other 
top moving averages. In the Texas market, the losses were very 
similar to the other averages implemented. Perhaps, if the gross 
losses could be substantially reduced without substantially reducing 
the net profit of the l-2w moving averages, then a viable marketing 
strategy would exist. 
Incorporating Relative Strength Index With 
Optimum Moving Averages 
In the futures market, combinations of technical tools have 
provided more reliable trades compared with the use of a single tool. 
Using different technical tools simultaneously to yield more reliable 
trades ~s called "The Principal of Coincidence". 5 Using the 
previously stated principle, RSI along with mov~ng averages could be 
expected to reduce the losses associated with the sole use of moving 
averages. 
Most losses associated with a moving average scheme result from 
"whipsaw effects". A Relative Strength Index works best during times 
of consolidation which is where moving averages encounter the 
whipsaws. So the use of some objective rules with respect toRSI 
values, might enable cattlemen to enhance their trading abilities. 
The RSI values for all three markets for the eleven year period 
ranged from the mid 20s 'to the low 90s which suggests that the 20s 
indicated the bottoming of the markets and the 90s indicated the top 
5 
Robert Parada and Gerry Je llis, "Putting Lines and Angles 
Together", Futures, January 1984, pp. 82-84. 
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of the markets. T,-7ith the above information, three rules were 
implemented to augment the moving average scheme as follows: 
1. Enter into a buy ;-c-':lition whenever RSI fell below a value of 
30, if the moving averages had not already indicated a buy signal 
earlier. 
2. Never se 11 when the moving averages so indicated with RSI 
below a value of 40. 
3. Sell whenever RSI rose above a value of 90, if the averages 
had not yet indicated a sell signal. 
The results of these RSI rules in conjunction with the l-2w 
moving averages and the 17 to 25 week restriction period can be seen 
~n Tables VIII-X. Note that the figures quoted in Tables VIII-X are 
~n terms of dollars per head, assuming that on the average the animals 
marketed would weigh 1000 pounds, as compared with dollars per 
hundredweight in the previous tables. The number of pens (determined 
by the number of buy signals generated by the marketing strategy) were 
reduced as were the number of consecutive losses in all cases. 
Although the more realistic technical marketing strategy produced a 
significantly lower net profit, the latter strategy did show some 
respectable results with every market having a positive average net 
profit per pen. So the technical marketing strategy with the 17 to 25 
week restriction period might prove worthy in aiding producers in 
their marketing decisions. 
At first glance, the marketing strategy put forth in this chapter 
might appear to be very useful to the cattle industry, however, this 
marketing strategy has not been compared with what cattlemen might be 
using currently. Therefore, the next chapter was devoted to testing 
TABLE VIII 
HOVING AVERAGE AND RELATIVE STRENGTH INDEX HARKETING STRATEGY 
RESULTS FOR OHAHA SLAUGHTER STEERS, 1972-1982 
Sum of 1 
Largest Average 
Set of Net 
Hoving Penetration Net Gross Gross Consecutive Profit/ 
Average Rule Profit Profit Losses Losses Pen 
----
$ /cwt ------------------Dollars Per Head--------------------
l-2w~< with 
RSI 396.20 886.90 q 90. 70 66.10 16.51 
l-2w with 
RST • OS 206.70 870.80 664.10 143.20 7.95 
l-2w with 
RSI .10 539.00 1066.40 527.40 126. 60 22.46 
l-2w with 
RSI .15 559.00 834.50 275.50 61.40 25.41 





























MOVING AVERAGE AND RELATIVE STRENGTH INDEX MARKETING STRATEGY 
RESULTS FOR O~~HA SLAUGHTER HEIFERS, 1972-1982 
Sum of 
1 Largest Average 
Set of Net 
Penetration Net Gross Gross Consecutive Profit/ 
Rule Profit Profit Losses Losses Pen 
$/cwt ------------------Dollars Per Head--------------------
392.70 793.90 401.20 132.80 15.10 
.05 379.00 .901. 80 522.80 195.90 15.79 
.10 515.90 965.40 449.50 143.20 23.45 
.15 497.80 866.80 369.00 91.70 24.89 





























HOVING AVERAGE AND RELATIVE STRENGTH INDEX MARKETING STRATEGY 
RESULTS FOR TEXAS SLAUGHTER STEERS, 1972-1982 
Sum of 1 Largest Average 
Set of Net 
Penetration Net Gross Gross Consecutive Profit/ 
Rule Profit Profit Losses Losses Pen 
$/cwt -----------------Dollars Per Head--------------------
509.70 979.10 469.40 45.80 19.60 
. 05 623.70 869.80 246.10 101.40 28.35 
.10 730.40 977.10 246.70 39.60 34.78 
.15 732. 30 979.00 246.70 39.60 34.87 



















this technical marketing strategy to a fixed period marketing 
strategy. 
Summary 
This chapter reviewed the popularity technical tools have had in 
the stock and futures market and suggested that those same technical 
tools might help cattlemen market their cash animals. After 
introducing the program that was to be used in this study, the 
discussion continued to be more specific about the time interval and 
the particular markets that would be used to calculate optimum moving 
average parameters. A warning was given for a nontested assumption 
that was assumed to hold over the long run. 
Various moving averages were tested and illustrated in tables 
with l-2w moving averages being superior in all markets. Penetration 
rules were added to assist in the profitability of the moving average 
scheme. A restriction period of 17 to 25 weeks after the initial buy 
signal before honoring any sell signals was instigated to provide a 
more realistic marketing strategy. Finally some objective rules of 
RS I were instigated in conjunction with the l-2w moving averages in an 
attempt to improve the overall marketing scheme. 
CHAPTER IV 
TESTING THE TECHNICAL MARKETING STRATEGY AGAINST 
A FIXED PERIOD MARKETING STRATEGY 
A marketing strategy of any sort will be useful only to the 
extent in which its rules are obeyed. The selection of a marketing 
strategy should be based upon one's circumstances such as the 
operator's risk-taking ability, goals, and understanding of the 
strategy. Any marketing strategy will inevitably have imperfections. 
However, if a producer knows of the limitations of the particular 
strategy, he can better prepare himself for the unpleasant times in 
order to reap the benefits of the profitable times. Therefore, the 
comparison of one strategy with another must continue if cattlemen 
hope to find the most suitable marketing strategy for their operation. 
The 21-Week Marketing Strategy 
The average feeding period for slaughter cattle s1.nce 1972 has 
1 been approximately 145 days. Depending upon the weather, rations 
used, and the initial weights of the cattle, the feeding period would 
1 
As stated by Dr. Keith S. Lusby, Associate Professor of the 
Animal Science Department at Oklahoma State University. 
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vary. From the above data, a marketing strategy of buying, feeding, 
and selling slaughter cattle in 21 weeks (days converted to weeks 
because of the weekly price data that were used) was assumed to be one 
current cash marketing plan. However, some cattlemen might only feed 
90 days in some instances, while in other instances they might feed as 
long as 200 days, so 145 days would not always be the exact feeding 
period. One reason for the feeding variance stemmed because cattle 
buyers were not necessarily ready for the delivery of the cattle at 
precisely 145 days (21 weeks) of feeding. Unfortunately, there is no 
documentation to support or reject the assumption that on the average, 
most slaughter cattle are marketed 21 weeks after they start a feeding 
program. Therefore, if the average feeding period is indeed 21 weeks, 
then one might logically conclude that cattle are also sold on the 
average of every 21 weeks. 
Table XI presents the 21-week marketing strategy for the three 
markets during the period of 1972-1982. Note that all the l-2w moving 
averages tried in the three markets (Tables VIII-X) were superior 1.0 
terms of net profit, gross losses, the sum of the largest set of 
consecutive losses, and the average net profit per pen compared with 
the 21-we ek strategy. The technical marketing strategy had fewer or 
the same consecutive losses, with the exception of the l-2w (05) 
strategy in the Texas market, when compared with the 21-week plan. 
Also, the technical strategy had fewer pens in every case. Since 
historical da~a showed that many of the technical marketing strategies 




TWENTY-ONE WEEK MARKETING STRATEGY RESULTS FOR 
SLAUGHTER CATTLE, 1972-1982 
Sum of 
1 Largest Average 
Set of Net 
Gross Gross Consecutive Profit/ 













Steers 247.90 904.80 656.90 174.90 9.18 











namely the l-2w mov~ng averages with RSI, was measured against the 
21-week strategy outside the moving averages parameter estimation 
period (1972-1982). 
The Technical Strategy Versus the 
21-Week Strategy 
For purposes of simplicity, both fixed and variable expenses were 
excluded from the analysis because they were assumed to be the same 
regardless of the marketing strategy chosen. The strategies assumed 
the operation to have the capability of being a continuous feedlot 
program, 
The test period started on December 25, 1982 and concluded on 
April 7, 1984. T a b 1 e s X I I -X IV p r e s e n t the r e s u 1 t s o f the two 
strategies in tt1e var~ous markets. Appendixes A, B, and C demonstrate 
how the results were obtained using a technical marketing strategy in 
the various markets. The technical tools were superior to the 21-week 
opt ion ~n terms of net profit and average profit per pen in the steer 
markets and mixed ~n the heifer market. 
The disappointing results ~n the heifer market might have 
occurred as the result of the recent lack of interest ~n feeding 
heifers, although the technical tools did perform well during the 
parameter estimation period for heifers. So there really appears to 
be no answer to the sudden turn about of the two strategies for 
slaughter heifers. However, the tecnical marketing strategy did 
provide superior results with the l-2w (10) and l-2w (15) marketing 
strategies compared with the 21-week strategy. 
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TABLE XII 
MARKETING STRATEGIES RESULTS FOR OMAHA SLAUGHTER STEERS, 
DECEMBER 25, 1982-APRIL 7, 1984 
Average 1 Number 
Net Gross Gross Largest Net of 
Strategy Profit Profit Losses Loss Profit/Pen Pens 
----------------Dollars Per Head----------------
21-week 86.50 164.00 77.50 77.50 28.83 3 
l-2w* 93.50 182.50 89.00 89.00 31.17 3 
with RSI 
l-2w(05) 93.50 182.50 89.00 89.00 31.17 3 
with RSI 
l-2w(l0) 149.50 149.50 0 0 74.75 2 
with RSI 
l-2w(l5) 142.00 142.00 0 0 71.00 2 
with RSI 
*"w" denotes linearly weighted moving average 
1 Average net profit per pen is calculated by dividing the net 
profit by the number of pens. 
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TABLE XIII 
MARKETING STRATEGIES RESULTS FOR OMAHA SLAUGHTER HEIFERS, 
DECEMBER 25, 1982-APRIL 7, 1984 
Average 1 Number 
Net Gross Gross Largest Net of 
Strategy Profit Profit Losses Loss Profit/Pen Pens 
--------------Dollars Per Head-------------------
21-week 86.70 164.70 78.00 78.00 28.90 3 
l-2w* 83.70 168.20 84.50 84.50 27.90 3 
with RSI 
l-2w(OS) 83.70 168.20 84.50 84.50 27.90 3 
with RSI 
l-2w·(l0) 104.70 189.20 84.50 8Lf, 50 34.90 3 
with RSI 
l-2w(l5) 104.70 189.20 84.50 84.50 34.90 3 
~vith RSI 
*''-•" denotes linearly weighted moving average 
1 Average net profit per pen is calculated by dividing the net 
profit by the number of pens. 
TABLE XIV 
MARKETING STPJ\TEGIES RESULTS FOR TEXAS SLAUGHTER STEERS, 





















85.40 165.90 80.50 80.50 28.47 
130.60 213.60 83.00 83.00 43.53 
130.60 213.60 83.00 83.00 43.53 
111.80 213.60 101.80 101.80 37.27 
147.00 147.00 0 0 73.50 










1The average net profit per pen is calculaced by dividing the net 
profit by the number of pens. 
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The success that was found tn the three markets suggest that the 
technical marketing strategy put forth in this study was a viable 
alternative to an assumed c:urrent marketing scheme. The technical 
tools did not produce a loss during the test period in two strategies 
1.n the Omaha steer markec and 1.n one strategy in the Texas steer 
market. However, the Omaha heifer market results were somewhat 
disappointing. 
Although the technical strategy was not perfect, historical data 
suggests that cattlemen can enhance their marketing abilities by using 
technical tools. Technical marketing strategies are not intended to 
replace what cattlemen feel prices are going to do, but simply augment 
their understanding of the present market conditions. 
Surrnnary 
A 21-week marketing plan was introduced based upon the average 
feeding period of cattle of 21 weeks. The limitations and narrowness 
of this marketing strategy were brought forth in an attempt not to 
mislead the reader into thinking that all slaughter cattle were 
marketed every 21 weeks. 
The 21-week strategy was tested against the optimum technical 
strategy from December 25, 1982 through April 7, 1984. The technical 
strategy proved to be vastly superior in the steer markets, but mixed 
in the heifer market. The results of the test left little doubt that 
technical tools could aid producers in their marketing decisions. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS AND THOUGHTS ABOUT FUTURE RESEARCH 
Since the early 1970s, cattlemen have been plagued with extremely 
volatile cattle prices. The past decade saw the exit of many 
cattlemen from livestock production because of their inability to cope 
with the highly capital-intensive operations of the cattle industry. 
A majority of those exiting during the past decade lacked the 
necessary skills for the successful marketing of their livestock. So 
to aid producers in their marketing decisions, marketing strategies 
which can decrease profit variability while maximizing net profits 
need to be developed. 
Chapter II presented the theoretical background for using moving 
averages and Relative Strength Index as price trend indicators. 
Calculations and illustrations of two and three moving averages trade 
signals were presented. A RSI illustration was used to depict 
overbought and oversold conditions in the futures market for live 
cattle. The necessary calculations for RSI were also given. 
Chapter III contained a description of the moving average and RSI 
program used for this study. The method for optimizing the moving 
average parameters was explained with the results shown. A period 
restriction for honoring sell signals was instigated in order to 
produce a more useful marketing strategy. RSI was incorporated with 
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the moving average technique in order to increase the effectiveness of 
the overall marketing strategy. The l-2w moving average scheme with 
RS I was found to be superior to the other technical strategies relying 
solely upon moving averages. The incorporation of RSI allowed earlier 
detection of market bottoms and tops compared with the sole use of 
moving averages. 
Chapter IV introduced the conception of a 21-week marketing plan 
based upon the average feeding period of slaughter cattle. The 
21-week plan was tested against the technical marketing strategy 
developed in Chapter III during the period of December 25, 1984 to 
April 7, 1984. In the Omaha steer market, the technical strategies 
yielded a more profitable outcome compared with the 21-week plan. The 
range ~n net profits for the technical tools was from $93.50 per head 
to $ll~o9.50 per head depending upon the penetration rule chosen as 
compared with a net profit of $86.50 per head for the 21-week 
strategy. The results were similar in the Texas steer market with a 
range of net profits from $111.80 per head to $147 per head for the 
technical tools and a net profit of $85.40 per head for the 21-week 
plan. However, the Omaha heifer market was completely different with 
the 21-week strategy yielding a net profit of $86.70 per head compared 
with the technical strategies' range of $83.70 per head to $104.70 per 
head. 
The primary objective of this thesis was met by the establishment 
of the l-2w moving averages incorporating RSI as the optimum technical 
marketing strategy. The firs t s p e c i f i c o b j e c t i v e was me t by 
determining the l-2w averages as the optimum moving averages for the 
past decade. The second specific objective of increasing profits and 
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reducing profit variability with the use of tehcnical tools was only 
fifty percent obtained. The technical tools reduced profit 
va r i ab i 1 it y in a 11 the markets during both the parameter Rstimation 
period (1972-1982) and the testing period, however, the technical 
too 1 s did not increase the profits in all cases in the heifer market 
during the testing period. Therefore, this technical marketing 
strategy should be considered for market analysis in steer markets, 
but should be refined before considering its use in the heifer 
markets. 
The technical marketing strategy put forth in this study would 
have indirectly helped producers manage their risk by reducing profit 
variability. Thus, the over a 11 conclusion was that the technical 
strategy, namely moving averages incorporated with RSI, could greatly 
aid cattlemen in their marketing decisions as when to buy and sell the 
physical animal. 
Future Research 
Viable marketing strategies are essential for American 
Agriculturalists to survive. Other technical tools need to be 
optimized not only over long periods of time which was done in this 
study, but during times of uptrending markets and downtrending 
markets. The principle of coincidence could be explored using more 
than just two technical tools. Also, technical tools could be 
experimented with to find optimum marketing strategies for 
stocker/feeder operations and for cow-calf operations to be 
implemented by producers in their marketing decisions. And finally, a 
48 
more comprehensive research is warranted on Wilder's RSI Ln which this 
study has ~erely scratched the surface. 
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APPENDIXES 
APPENDIX A 
TECHNICAL MARKETING STRATEGY RESULT WITH A $.10/CWT 
PENETH.ATION RULE FOR OMAHA CHOICE 2-4, 
900-1100 POUND STEERS FROM 
· 12-25-82 TO 4-7-84 
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Date Price 1 sw2 RSI Reason 3 
Gain 4 
(Loss) 
12-25-82 58.75B 58.61 39.06 MA 
01-01-83 59.50 59.25 42.50 
01-03--83 58.50(8) 58.83 39.31 Not Honored 
01-15-83 59.90 59.43 45.48 
01-22-83 59.95 59.66 44.27 
01-29-83 59.38 59.43 43.66 
02-05-83 60.12 59.87 47.07 
02-12-83 60.95 60.67 50.67 
02-19-83 61.28 61.17 52.07 
02-26-83 62.45 62.06 56.75 
03-05-83 62.58 62.53 57.25 
03-12-83 63.00 62.86 58.90 
03-19-83 63.80 63.53 61.91 
03-26-83 64.50 64.26 64.38 
04-02-83 66.25 65.66 69.66 
04-09-83 66.95 66.71 71.48 
04-16-83 68.02 67.66 74.05 
04-23-83 67.85 67.90 72.93 
04-30-83 68.00 67.95 73.31 
05-07-83 67.458 67.63 69.42 MA-20th week $8 7. 00 
05-14-83 67.65 67.58 70.04 
05-21-83 67.55 67.58 69.28 
05-23-83 67.40 67.45 68.09 
06-04-83 67.47 67.44 68.36 
06-11-83 66.72 66.97 62.20 
06-18-83 66.50 66.57 60.48 
06-25-83 65.00 65.50 50.26 
07-02-83 63.82 64.21 43.97 
07-09-83 63.75 63.77 43.62 
07-16-83 62.25 62.75 36.87 
07-23-83 61.50 61.75 33.66 
08-06-83 61.25 61.30 33.08 
08-13-83 61. 95B 61.71 38.44 MA 
08-20-83 62.02 61.99 38.97 
08-27-83 61.55 61.70 36.70 
09-03-83 59.60 60.25 29.11 
09-10-83 59.00 59.20 27.25 
09-17-83 59.30 59.20 29.68 
09-24-83 58.45 58.7 3 26.93 
10-01-83 60.00 59.48 38.15 
10-08-83 59.80 59.86 37.35 
10-15-83 60.00 59.93 38.7 3 
10-22-83 59.75 59.83 37.62 
10-29-83 58.75 59.08 33.47 
11-05-83 58.05 58.28 30.90 
Date Price 1 sw2 
11-12-83 58.70 58.48 
11-19-83 58.75 58.73 
11-26-83 59.50 59.25 
12-03-83 62.05 61.20 
12-10-83 60.75 61.18 
12-17-83 62.30 61.78 
12-24-83 63.40 63.03 
12-31-83 64.94 64.42 
01-07-84 65.00 64.98 
01-14-84 66.70 66.13 
01-21-84 68.40 67.83 
01-28-84 68.20S 68.26 
02-04-84 67.45 67.70 
02-ll-84 67.25 67.31 
02-18-84 66.55 66.78 
02-25-84 66.90B 66.78 
03-03-84 67.50 67.30 
03-10-84 68.05 67.86 
03-17-84 69.20 68.81 
03-24-84 68.25 68.56 
03-31-84 68.90 68.68 






























~eekly average price ($/cwt) and one week moving average with B 
and S denoting buy and sell signals respectively. 
2Two-week linearly weighted moving average. 
3Details why the buy was initialed (i.e. MA denotes moving average 
signal) and why the sell signal was honored (i.e. between 17-25 week 
period and confirmed by RSI). 
Period 
12-25-82 to 05-07-83 
08-13-83 to 01-28-84 
02-25-84 to 04-07-84 
4Figures given in $/head. 





TECHNICAL MARKETING STRATEGY RESULT WITH A $.15/CWT 
PENETRATION RULE FOR OMAHA CHOICE 2-4, 
900-1100 POU~~ HEIFERS FROM 
12-25-82 TO 4-7-84 
55 
56 
Date Price 1 sw2 RSI Reason 3 
Gain 4 
(Loss) 
12-25-82 57.38B 57.17 39.87 MA 
01-01-83 58.12 57.87 43.17 
01-08-83 57.65(8) 57.80 41.61 Not Honored 
01-15-83 58.85 58.45 46.89 
01-22-83 58.48 58.60 45.52 
01-29-83 58.60 58.56 46.07 
02-05-83 59.72 59.34 51.04 
02-12-83 60.25 60.07 53.23 
02-19-83 60.55 60.45 54.47 
02-26-83 61.45 61.15 58.08 
03-05-83 61.35 61.38 57.53 
03-12-83 60.15 60.55 51.31 
03-19-83 62.78 61.90 61.21 
03-26-83 63.60 63.32 63.69 
04-02-83 65.38 64.78 68.40 
04-09-83 66.05 65.82 69.98 
04-16-83 67.25 66.85 72.63 
04-23-83 66.408 66.68 68.06 MA-18th week $90.20 
04-30-83 67.05B 66.83 69.63 
05-07-83 66.20 66.48 65.11 
05-14-83 66.40 66.33 65.68 
05-21-83 66.40 66.40 65.68 
05-28-83 65.85 66.03 62.45 
06-04-83 63.25 64.11 49.97 
06-11-83 64.38 64.00 54.25 
06-18-83 64.10 64.19 53.04 
06-25-83 62.32 62.91 46.01 
07-02-83 62.25 62.27 45.75 
07-09-83 62.94 62.71 48.79 
07-16-83 61.18 61.76 42.29 
07-23-83 60.02 60.40 38.64 
07-30-83 59.80 59.87 37.97 
08-06-83 59.70 59.73 37.65 
08-13-83 60.25 60.06 40.61 
08-20-83 60.72 60.56 43.09 
08-27-83 59.85 60.14 39.77 
09-03-83 58.05 58,65 33.95 
09-10-83 57.75 57.85 33.08 
09-17-83 58.30 58.11 36.30 
09-24-83 57.50 57.76 33.75 
10-01-83 59.05 58.53 42.21 
10-08-83 58.608 58.75 40.59 MA-24th week ($84.50) 
10-15-8.3 58.75 58.70 41.40 
10-22-83 58.80 58,'78 41.68 
10-29-83 57.85 58.16 37.91 
11-05-83 57.00 57.28 34.88 
Date Price 1 sw2 
11-12-83 57.55B 57.36 
11-19-83 57.70 57.65 
11-26-83 58.75 58.40 
12-03-83 61.25 60.41 
12-10-83 60.18 60.53 
12-17-83 61.80 61.26 
12-24-83 63.70 63.06 
12-31-83 65.38 64.82 
01-07-84 64.62 64.87 
01-14-84 66.00 65.54 
01-21-84 67.65 67.10 
01-28-84 67.55 67.58 
02-04-84 66.55 66.88 
02-11-84 66.32 66.39 
02-18-84 65.35 65.67 
02-25-84 65.70 65.58 
03-03-84 66.20 66.03 
03-10-84 66.65 66.50 
03-17-84 68.10 67.61 
03-24-84 67.45S 67.66 
03-31-84 67.90B 67.75 





























MA-19th week $99.00 
1 
\Veekly average price ($/c·wt) and one week moving average with B 
and S denoting buy and sell signals respectively. 
2Two-week linearly weighted moving average. 
3Details why the buy was initialed (i.e. MA denotes moving average 
signal) and why the sell signal was honored (i.e. between 17-25 ~.;eek 
period and confirmed by RSI). 
Period 
12-25-82 to 04-23-83 
04-30-83 to 10-08-83 
11-12-83 to 03-24-83 
03-31-83 to -4-07-84 
4Figures given in $/head. 






TECHNICAL MARKETING STRATEGY RESULT WITH A $.15/CWT 
PENETRATION RULE FOR TEXAS CHOICE 2-4, 
900-1100 POUND STEERS FROM 








R8I Reason (Loss) 
12-25-82 61.44 61.32 42.67 
01-01-83 62.12B 61.89 45.23 HA 
01-08-83 61.55(8) 61.74 43.48 Not Honored 
01-15-83 62.25 62.01 46.23 
01-22-83 61.95 62.05 45.21 
01-29-83 61.45 61.61 43.50 
02-05-83 6/..05 61.85 46.14 
02-12-83 62.78 62.53 49.25 
02-19-83 62.70 62.72 48.92 
02-26-83 63.55 63.26 52.59 
03-05-83 64.15 63.95 55.04 
03-12-83 64.10 64.11 54.79 
03-19-83 64.90 64.63 58.13 
03-26-83 66.15 65.73 62.75 
04-02-83 69.10 68.11 70.92 
04-09-83 70.58 70.08 74.00 
04-16-83 72.52 71.87 77.38 
04-23-83 71.558 71.87 72.32 MA-17th week $94.30 
04-30-83 70.80 71.05 68.58 
05-07-83 68.98 69.58 60.42 
05-14-83 69.30 69.19' 61.29 
05-21-83 69.35 69.33 61.43 
05-28-83 69.05 69.15 60.00 
06-04-83 68.34 68.57 56.63 
06-ll-83 68.15 68.21 55.73 
06-18=83 67.52 67.73 52.74 
06-25-83 65.98 66.49 46.20 
07-02-83 65.18 65.44 43.20 
07-09-83 65.28 65.24 ' 43.69 
07-16-83 63.70 64.22 38.08 
07-23-83 63.10 63.30 36.18 
07-30-83 62.95 63.00 35.71 
08-06-83 63. 42B 63.26 38.46 MA 
08-13-83 63.88 63.72 41.11 
08-20-83 63.65 63.72 40.18 
08-27-83 61.75 62.38 33.42 
09-03-83 59.15 60.01 26.79 
09-19-83 59.06 59.09 26.59 
09-17-83 59.45 59.32 29.02 
09-24-83 59.30 59.35 28.63 
10-01-83 60.90 60.36 38.24 
10-08-83 61.22 61.11 39.98 
10-15-83 61.00 61.07 39.16 
10-22-83 60.82 60.88 38.47 
10-29-83 59.80 60.14 34.72 
11-05-83 59.30 59.46 33.02 
60 
Date Price 1 sw2 RSI 
3 Gain 4 
Reason (Loss) 
11-12-83 59.94 59.72 37.25 
11-19-83 61.02 60.66 43.71 
11-26-83 62.21 61.81 49.84 
12-03-83 64.10 63.47 57.72 
12-10-83 64.75 64.53 60.04 
12-17-83 66.50 65.91 65.53 
12-24-83 67.90 67.43 69.18 
12-31-83 69.50 68.96 72.73 
01-07-84 68.69S 68.96 68.43 MA-23rd week $52.70 
01-14-84 69.05 68.93 69.30 
01-21-84 70.40B 69.95 72.37 
01-28-84 69.82 70.01 69.17 
02-04-84 68.72 69.08 63.44 
02-11-84 68.25 68.40 61.11 
02-18-84 67.72 67.89 58.50 
02-25-84 68.20 68.04 60.16 
03-03-84 69.25 68.90 63'. 59 
03-10-84 70.18 69.87 66.35 
03-17-84 71.38 70.98 69.56 
03-24-84 70.85 71.02 66.54 
03-31-84 71.58 71.33 68.56 
04-07-84 71.35 71.42 67.18 
1weekly average price ($/cwt) and one week moving average with B 
and S denoting buy and sell signals respectively. 
2Two-week linearly weighted moving average. 
3netails why the buy was initialed (i.e. MA denotes moving average 
signal) and ~vhy the sell signal was honored (i.e. between 17-25 week 
period and confirmed by RSI). 
Period 
01-01-83 to 04-23-83 
08-06-83 to 01-07-84 
01-21-84 to 04-07-84 
4Figures given in $/head. 
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